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Note

Double Jeopardy: Government
Appeals of Sentences
United States v. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. 117 (1980)
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be "subject
for the same offense to be twice put, in jeopardy of life or limb
.... "1 Despite an ancient pedigree, 2 the "familiar, but unilluminating"3 words of the double jeopardy clause have led to a
body of case law that "can hardly be characterized as [a model] of
consistency and clarity."4 Possibly as a result of this acknowledged state of confusion, the principles and applications of the
double jeopardy guarantee present vital issues facing the American legal system.5 Any discussion of the double jeopardy clause is
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. Demosthenes, the fourth century B.C., Athenian statesman, stated "[TIhe
laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue .... " DEMOSTHENES 589 (Vance trans. 1962) quoted in United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d
868, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1973), aO'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). For the history of double
jeopardy see M. F mUDLAND,DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-15 (1969).
3. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973).
4. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 6 (1978).
5. Justice Blackmun, writing the majority opinion in United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) stated: '"thatthe [double jeopardy] Clause
is important and vital in this day is demonstrated by the host of recent cases.
That its application has not proved to be facile or routine is demonstrated by
acknowledged changes in direction or in emphasis." Id. at 127.
One of these vital issues, which the Court faced in DiFrancescois government appeals of sentences. Professional and academic commentary on the
subject of government appeals of sentences is divided. Articles concluding
that such review is constitutional include: Dunsky, The Constitutionalityof
Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. CRnm. L. & CRmHNoLoGY 19
(1978); Hruska, Appellate Review of Sentences, 8 Am.CPnIM. I.Q. 10 (1969);
Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463 (1974); Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: A ConstitutionalResponse to Arbitrary and Unreasonable
Sentences, 18 Am.CaM. L. REV. 51 (1980); Westen, The Three Faces of Double
Jeopardy:Reflections on Government Appeals of Sentences, 78 MCH. L REV.
1001 (1980); Note, Double Jeopardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal of
Sentences, 1980 DUKE IJ. 847 (1980); Comment, 65 CoRNuLL I. REV. 715
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especially critical today because the clause is an integral part of
the American criminal justice system that is presently the target of
6
popular dissatisfaction growing out of a fear of increasing crime,
7
and the subject of a wave of professional reforming zeal.
It was in this milieu that the United States Supreme Court
faced, for the first time, 8 the question of the constitutionality of a

federal statute 9 which granted government prosecutors the right to

appeal the sentence of a criminal defendant because it was too lenient. In the landmark decision of United States v. DiFrancesco,'0
the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and held that the appeal provision
of 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) did not violate the double jeopardy clause

of the fifth amendment." Justice Blackmun, writing for the major(1980). Articles concluding that such review is unconstitutional include: ABA
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Criminal Code, Report on Government Appeal
of Sentences, 35 Bus. LAw. 617 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Ad Hoc Committee]; Freeman & Earley, United States v. DiFrancesco:Government Appeal
of Sentences, 18 AM. Cnn. L REv. 91 (1980); Spence, The Federal Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1977 and ProsecutorialAppeal of Sentences: Justice or
Double Jeopardy?, 37 MD. L. REv. 739 (1978); Note, Twice in Jeopardy:
ProsecutorialAppeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REv. 325 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Why the Justice System Fails, TmE, Mar. 23, 1981, at 24, quoting the
Citizens Crime Commission of New York. "Unless we make the punishment
for serious crime more certain and more appropriate, we cannot expect any
respite from the violence now engulfing the city."
7. See, e.g., Burger, W., Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the
ChiefJustice of the United States, 67 A.B.A.J. 290 (1981). The Chief Justice in
a speech aimed primarily at criminal justice reform, stated: "At every stage
the [criminal justice] system cries out for change, and I do not exclude the
adjudicatory stage. At each step in this process the primary goal, for both the
individual and society, is protection and security. This theme runs throughout all history." Id. at 290. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COIMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 116-17 (1973); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK

FORCE REPORT- THE COURTS 203 (1967) (Both supporting appellate review of
sentences). The ABA has reversed course on several occasions on the issue
of government appeals of sentences. However, the current ABA position opposes government appeals of sentences. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, APPELLATE REVIEw OF SENTENCES,

8.
9.

10.
11.

Standard 20-1.1 (2d ed. rev. approved June 1980), cited in Freeman & Earley,
supra note 5, at 93. For history of the ABA's position prior to the 1980 resolution, see Freeman & Earley, supra note 5, at 92-93; ABA Ad Hoc Committee,
supra note 5, at 617-19.
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 125 n.9 (1980).
18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). For a history of the dangerous special offender provisions, including section 3576, of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 950 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1976)),
see Comment, supra note 5, at 715-17.
449 U.S. 117 (1980).
Id. at 143.
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ity,12 concluded that section 3576, granting the government ,the
right, under specified conditions, to appeal a sentence imposed
upon a convicted dangerous special offender did not violate the
guarantees against multiple trials and multiple punishments,
which are inherent in the double jeopardy clause. The Court held
that a review of an appeal does not, in itself, constitute a multiple
trial in violation of the double jeopardy guarantee.13 Because a
sentence is not accorded the same degree of finality as an acquittal, the majority concluded that a review of a sentence did not violate the double jeopardy protection against reprosecution after an
acquittal.14
By limiting the dicta and holdings in earlier cases, the majority
was able to conclude that increasing the length of a defendant's
sentence on appeal was not barred by the double jeopardy protection from multiple punishments. 5 This result was strengthened
by the majority's determination that a defendant could have no expectation in the finality of his original sentence where Congress
had specifically provided in the dangerous special offender statute
that the sentence is subject to appeal.16
While the DiFrancesco decision's value as an instrument of
clarity or as an effective tool of reform may be in doubt,17 the majority holding will undoubtedly have an impact not only on federal' 8 and state 9 law, but also on the fundamental tenets of the
12. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and by Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell. There were two dissenting opinions. The principal dissent, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 143. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 152.
13. Id. at 131.
14. Id. at 137.
15. Id. at 138.
16. Id. at 134-35.
17. See notes 113-32 & accompanying text infra.
18. One of the most controversial issues Congress faced in its attempt to recodify
the Federal Criminal Code has been government appeal of sentences. The
present House bill does not provide for government appeal of sentences. H.R.
6915, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 4101 (1980). However, the present Senate bill
does allow for such appeals. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3725 (1979). The
possible impact of the Supreme Court's decision in DiFrancesco was noted
by the government in its petition for certiorari, where it argued that certiorari
should be granted because the second circuit's decision in United States v.
DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1979) "would appear to cast substantial
doubt on the validity of a key section of the revised criminal code that is now
pending in Congress. This section permits appellate review, at the government's behest, of sentences that are not within specific guidelines." Government's Petition for Certiorari at 9-10, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117 (1980), quoted in Freeman & Earley, supra note 5, at 93-94 n.16. See also
ABA Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5, at 619.
19. "[TJhe Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment has application to
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criminal justice system as a whole.20
This note will analyze the DiFrancescodecision in the context
of double jeopardy law and discuss the decision's effect on double
jeopardy principles. This note will also suggest that the majority
opinion in DiFrancesco,ignoring as it does the tradition of double
jeopardy protection, was not a completely satisfactory response to
the issues facing the Court and will have a restrictive effect on the
American system of individualized sentencing.

II. THE FACTS OF UNITED STATES v. DIFRANCESCO21
Eugene DiFrancesco was convicted of racketeering activities
and conspiracy in a 1977 jury trial in the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York.22 The next year in
another jury trial in the same district, DiFrancesco was convicted
24
of damaging federal property, 23 unlawfully storing explosives,
25
and conspiracy.
DiFrancesco was sentenced to a total of nine
years on his convictions in the second trial.
Prior to the first trial, the government had filed a notice 26 indithe States through the Fourteenth Amendment."

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

26.

United States v.

DiFrancesco 449 U.S. 117, 131 n.12, (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). No state statute presently authorizes increase of a sentence on an appeal by the government alone. See Dunsky, supra note 5, at 20-21, 21 n.8 (discussing various state statutes); Spence,
supra note 5, at 769 n.155 (listing state statutes).
Two commentators have suggested that, with government appeals of
sentences "we are confronted with a proposed enhancement of general
prosecutorial power unprecedented in the past three centuries of AngloAmerican administration of justice." Freeman & Earley, supra note 5, at 122.
449 U.S. 117 (1980).
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 122 (1980). DiFrancesco was convicted for his participation in an arson-for-hire scheme responsible for eight
fires in upstate New York. Id. at 124. Such activities were a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962 (c)-(d) (1976), which carries a maximum punishment of a fine of
not more than $25,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both
plus specified forfeitures. Id. § 1963.
449 U.S. at 122. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) which carries a
maximum punishment, if the damages exceed $100, of a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.
449 U.S. at 122. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 842(j) (1976) which carries a
maximum punishment of a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both. Id. § 844(b).
449 U.S. at 122. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) which carries a
maximum punishment, when the offense that is the object of the conspiracy
is not a misdemeanor, of a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of
not more than five years, or both. The three convictions at the second trial
arose from DiFrancesco's participation in the 1970 "Columbus Day bombings" which included the bombing of the federal building in Rochester. 449
U.S. at 124.
449 U.S. at 124.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:828

cating its intent to invoke the dangerous offender sentencing provision of Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.27 Under

the dangerous special offender statute, the prosecutor can secure
enhanced sentences upon conviction if it is established at a postconviction hearing that the defendant falls within one of three
"dangerous special offender" categories. 28 A hearing was held after DiFrancesco's conviction in the first trial but before the sentencing in the second trial, and the district court ruled that
DiFrancesco was a dangerous special offender within the meaning
of the statute. 29 The court thereupon sentenced DiFrancesco
under section 3575(b) to two 10-year sentences on the racketeering
counts, upon which he was convicted at the first trial, to be served
concurrently with each other and with the nine-year sentence imposed after conviction at the second trial.30 Thus, the dangerous
special offender hearing resulted, in effect, in additional punishment of one year. The government was dissatisfied with this result
and petitioned for a review under section 3576 of the sentences imposed upon DiFrancesco as a dangerous special offender. 31 By a
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3576 (1976).
28. Id. § 3575. Under section 3575, the prosecuting attorney must first file a notice
with the court alleging that a defendant is a "dangerous special offender" and
setting out the reasons for such allegation. Id. § 3575(a). The court then holds
a post-trial hearing to determine if the defendant is a "dangerous special offender." Id. § 3575(b). If it appears by a "preponderance of the information"
that the defendant is a "dangerous special offender," the court can sentence
the defendant "to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed
twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term
otherwise authorized by law for such felony. Otherwise it shall sentence the
defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony."
Id. Finally, section 3575 contains definitions of "dangerous special offender."
Id. § 3575(e)-(d).
29. 449 U.S. at 124. The district court concluded that DiFrancesco's criminal history "reveals a pattern of habitual and knowing criminal conduct of the most
violent and dangerous nature against the lives and property of the citizens of
this community. It further shows the defendant's complete and utter disregard for the public safety. The defendant, by virtue of his own criminal record, has shown himself to be a hardened habitual criminal from whom the
public must be protected for as long a period as possible." Id. (citing App. 27-

28 at 43).
30. 449 U.S. at 124.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) provides:
With respect to the imposition, correction,or reduction of a sentence
after proceedings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the
sentence on the record of the sentencing court may be taken by the
defendant or the United States to a court of appeals .... Review of
the sentence shall include review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were clearly erroneous, or the
sentencing court's discretion was abused. The court of appeals on
review of the sentence may, after considering the record, including
the entire presentence report, information submitted during the trial
of such felony and the sentencing hearing, and the findings and rea-
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divided vote, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dis32
In
missed the government appeal on double jeopardy grounds.
reaching this decision, the court noted that the government's action was the first time the government had attempted to exercise a
statutory power to seek an increase in sentence on appeal on the
ground that the sentence imposed was too lenient.3 3 Strictly construing the language of section 3576,34 the Second Circuit determined that the district court's sentence was "final" rather than
"tentative,"35 and that any appeal which could lead to an increase
in the sentence would place the defendant twice in jeopardy. 3 6 After examining the dicta in previous cases, 37 and determining that
the increase of a valid sentence on appeal constituted "multiple
punishment," 38 the court concluded: "To subject Eugene
DiFrancesco for a second time to the risk of the entire range of
penalties that the law provides for his crimes would violate the
39
[double jeopardy] constitutional policy."
The government's petition for certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court,40 and the case was decided on December 9, 1980.4

32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

sons of the sentencing court, affirm the sentence, impose or direct
the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court could
originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings and imposition of sentence, except that a sentence may be made
more severe only on review of the sentence taken by the United
States and after hearing. Failure of the United States to take a review of the imposition of the sentence shall, upon review taken by
the United States of the correction or reduction of the sentence, foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe than that previously imposed. Any withdrawal or dismissal of review of the sentence taken
by the United States shall foreclose imposition of a sentence more
severe than that reviewed but shall not otherwise foreclose the review of the sentence or the appeal of the conviction. The court of
appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its disposition of the
review of the sentence. Any review of the sentence taken by the
United States may be dismissed on a showing of abuse of the right of
the United States to take such review.
United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 787 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 781. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 849(h) (1976), is the only other statute that gives the
government the power to appeal a sentence. United States v. DiFrancesco,
604 F.2d 769 n.16 (1979).
604 F.2d at 782.
Id.
Id. at 783.
See note 95 infra.
604 F.2d at 785.
Id. at 787.
United States v. DiFrancesco, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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III. ANALYSIS
Generally, the United States "has no right of appeal in a criminal case absent explicit statutory authority."42 Under the statute
involved in DiFrancesco,the government is permitted to appeal in
any criminal case except "where the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution." 43 Thus,
the only barriers to an appeal under the statute at issue in the
DiFrancesco case are the general constitutional principles enumerated in the cases.
Although DiFrancesco was a case of first impression,4 4 the
Supreme Court was not traveling in completely unexplored territory. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the decision within the general framework of double jeopardy principles and applications so
as to discern the diffuse and often paradoxical state of "conceptual
confusion" 45 upon which the Supreme Court had to draw to reach
a decision.
Although no single principle unifies the double jeopardy guar47
antee,46 Justice Black's discussion in Green v. United States is
often cited to illustrate the general design of the fifth amendment
clause:
The underlying idea, [of double jeopardy protection], one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing8 the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
4

guilty.

Within this general design, the Court has, over the years, expressed numerous purposes for the double jeopardy clause's pro42. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1980).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
44. 449 U.S. at 125-26 n.9. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted:
The government has not rushed to make use of its new power to seek
review of sentences. Whether this has resulted from doubts about
the constitutionality of the procedure, an extraordinary degree of satisfaction with the sentences imposed under the dangerous special offender provision, a decision to allocate prosecutorial resources to
other tasks, or other factors is of course only a matter of speculation,
but this case is apparently the government's first attempt to obtain
review of a sentence on appeal.
604 F.2d 769, 781 (2d Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
45. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
46. Comment, supra note 5, at 719.
47. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
48. Id. at 187-88.
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tections. Both preservation of "the finality of judgments" 49 and
protection of the "integrity of a final judgment" 5 0 have been suggested as primary purposes for the clause. The double jeopardy
guarantee has also been said to serve as a barrier to "affording the
prosecutor another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed
to muster in the first proceedings." 51 In Ex parte Lange,52 the
Court stressed another purpose: "It is the punishment that would
legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger
guarded against by the Constitution."
The double jeopardy guarantee generally provides protection in
the following situations: "It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and it protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense."5 3
All of these situations were implicated in the DiFrancescocase.
First, the Supreme Court resolved whether the review of a sentence on appeal involved a multiple trial constituting a second
prosecution for the same offense after an acquittalor a conviction.
Second, the Court decided whether the increase of a sentence on
appeal constituted a multiple punishment for the same offense.
A.

Multiple Trials

In Kepner v. United States,5 4 the Supreme Court established
that the double jeopardy clause clearly prohibits retrial after a

final judgment of acquittal.55 According to the Court, the public
49. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28,33 (1978). See generally Westen & Drubel, Toward a
General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. RE.v. 85-87 (1978).
50. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
51. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 215-16 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
11 (1978).
52. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874).
53. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
54. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
55. Id. at 130. An exception to the bar against retrial after acquittal exists, however, where a mistrial is declared on the defendant's initiative (absent any
bad faith conduct by judge or prosecutor). United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600, 607 (1976). Similarly, further proceedings are not precluded where a mistrial is declared for "manifest necessity." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (retrial allowed where trial judge, without the consent
of the defendant, discharged a jury which had been unable to reach a verdict). See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (retrial allowed where
defective indictment dismissed after jury sworn in); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S.
684 (1949) (retrial allowed where combat field conditions necessitated withdrawal of court martial charges). But see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470
(1971) (plurality opinion) (retrial not allowed where judge abused discretion
in declaring a mistrial). And where a defendant obtains dismissal prior to a
jury verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, the double
jeopardy clause does not prevent retrial United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,
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interest in the finality of criminal judgments so outweighs the government's interest in retrial that an acquittal will stand even
56
where it was based on egregious error.
The majority in DiFrancescowas able to conclude that section
3576 did not violate the prohibition against a second trial after acquittal by concentrating on "fundamental distinctions" between
acquittals and sentences. 57 The majority found: "Appeal of a sentence... would seem to be a violation of double jeopardy only if
the original sentence, as pronounced, is to be treated in the same
way as an acquittal is treated, and the appeal is to be treated in the

same way as a retrial."58

The Court's mention of the way "an acquittal is treated" is apparently a reference to the theory of "implied acquittal" first expressed in Green v. United States.59 In Green, the Supreme Court
held that a jury's verdict that a defendant was guilty of seconddegree murder, where the charge to the jury permitted it to find
defendant guilty of first-degree murder, represented the jury's "implied" finding that the facts did not warrant a first-degree murder

56.

57.

58.
59.

98-99 (1977). Nor does the double jeopardy clause bar a government appeal
from a ruling in favor of the defendant after the trier of fact had entered a
guilty verdict. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). This result is justified because "a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of
law when that error could be corrected [by reinstatement of jury verdict]
without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact." Id. at
345.
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (citing Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)). An additional rationale for the prohibition
against retrials after acquittals is the jury's "prerogative to acquit against the
evidence." Westen, supra note 5, at 1012. However, the prohibition against
retrials after acquittals does not apply to less formal counterparts of acquittals. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). In Serfass, the Court
held that the government was not barred from appealing a pretrial order dismissing an indictment because jeopardy had not "attached" in the earlier
proceedings. Id. at 390-92. This result was justified, so the Court felt, because
the pretrial determination spared the defendant from the ordeal of a full trial
and because the prosecutor was not being given a second chance to argue
before a trier of fact. Id. at 391. But see United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), in which the Court held the government's appeal impermissible where the trial court had granted defendant's motion for acquittal after a deadlocked jury had been discharged. Although the trial court's
action was based on a declaration of mistrial before the entry of the formal
judgment of acquittal, the Court ignored "artificial distinctions" and found
the action to be an acquittal in substance as well as in form. Id. at 572, 574.
449 U.S. at 133. The majority did not address the due process or equal protection arguments that have been leveled at government appeals of sentences.
Such theories, which are beyond the scope of this Note, are discussed in ABA
Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5 at 628-39; Freeman & Earley, supra note 5 at
118-21.
449 U.S. at 133.
355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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conviction.60 Thus, since there was an "implied acquittal" of the
greater charges, a retrial on the first-degree murder charge would
be a violation of the double jeopardy protection from multiple trials after an acquittal.61
By analogy, if sentences are to be treated in the same manner
as acquittals, then the imposition of a five-year sentence where a
ten-year sentence would be permissible under the sentencing statute, would constitute a factfinder determination that the greater
sentence was unwarranted. 62 In effect, the defendant would be
"impliedly acquitted" of the extra five-year sentence which he did
not receive. 63 However, the majority of the Court in DiFrancesco
60. Id. at 190. The "implied acquittal" doctrine was reaffirmed by the Court in
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970). In Price, the defendant was charged
with murder, but was only convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to from 10 to 15 years imprisonment. The defendant successfully appealed his conviction and was subsequently retried for murder but once
again was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was placed twice in
jeopardy at the retrial: "Although the petitioner was not convicted of the
greater charge on retrial, whereas Green was, the risk of conviction on the
greater charge was the same in both cases, and the double jeopardy clause of
the Fifth Amendment is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment." Id. at 329. See also United States v. Barket, 530
F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v.
Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 1972).
61. 355 U.S. at 190.
62. Justice Stevens based his dissent in DiFrancescoalmost completely on the
similarity of "implicit acquittal" status of offenses and sentences. 449 U.S. at
152-54. Justice Stevens felt that the Court had never really replied to the argument put forth by Justice Harlan in his separate opinion in North Carolina
v. Pearce:
And the concept or fiction of an 'implicit acquittal' of the greater offense, ibid., applies equally to the greater sentence: in each case it
was determined at the former trial that the defendant or his offense
was of a certain limited degree of 'badness' or gravity only, and therefore merited only a certain limited punishment.
395 U.S. 711, 746-47 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part),
quoted in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Apparently, Justice Stevens would disagree with the holding in Pearce,
but the majority in DiFrancescomade it clear that they were "not inclined to
overrule Pearce." 449 U.S. at 135-36 n.14.
63. This was the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in the principal dissent
in DiFrancesco:
The sentencing of a convicted criminal is sufficiently analagous to a
determination of guilt or innocence that the Double Jeopardy Clause
should preclude government appeals from sentencing decisions very
much as it prevents appeals from judgments of acquittal ... In
both acquittals and sentences, the trier of fact makes a factual adjudication that removes from defendant's burden of risk the charges of
which he was acquitted and the potential sentences which he did not
receive.
449 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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refused to extend the "implied acquittal" doctrine to sentences,
based on the greater degree of finality that has been accorded to
both explicit and implicit acquittals. 64 According to the majority,
legal history demonstrated that the common law never ascribed
the finality to a sentence that would prevent 65a legislative body
from authorizing its appeal by the prosecution.
The Court also found that its previous decisions "clearly establish that a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional
finality that attend an acquittal." 66 The majority cited Bozza v.
United States,6 7 as support for this contention. 68 In Bozza, the
Court held that the double jeopardy clause was not offended where
the trial court changed, on the same day, the defendant's sentence
of imprisonment, to both a fine and imprisonment, where the
mandatory minimum was both a fine and imprisonment. 69 However, in citing Bozza, the majority failed to give any weight to the
fact that the original sentence in Bozza was illegal i.e., below the
statutory minimum, whereas DiFrancesco's original sentence as a
dangerous 70special offender was within the range of statutory
sentences.
Additionally, the Court found support for its determination of
the lack of sentence finality in North Carolinav. Pearce.71 The majority cited Pearce for the proposition that the double jeopardy
clause does not bar the imposition of a more severe sentence on
reconviction after the defendant's successful appeal of the original
conviction. 72 The majority dismissed the difference between the
64. Id. at 136.
65. Id. at 133. The majority also cited Canadian and New Zealand statutes as
evidence that countries tracing their legal systems to the English common
law permit appeals of sentences. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that in
England, prosecutorial appeal of sentences is forbidden and an appellate
court cannot increase, at its own insistence, sentences imposed by a trial
judge. ABA Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5, at 640-41.
66. 449 U.S. at 134.
67. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
68. 449 U.S. at 134.
69. 330 U.S. at 166-67.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976) provides: "[T]he court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years
and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony."
71. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
72. 449 U.S. at 135. Although the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant
from reprosecution for the same offense after conviction, the Court has created a major exception allowing the state to retry a defendant who has succeeded in having his first conviction set aside on appeal because of error in
the trial. Id. This doctrine was first enunciated in United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896): "[I] t is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment
against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the
same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offense of which
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imposition of a new sentence after retrialin Pearce, and the imposition of a new sentence on appeal in DiFrancesco as "no more
than a conceptual nicety."73 In emphasizing the Pearce holding,
the Court ignored the fact that the Pearce Court based its decision
allowing more severe punishment after retrial "upon the premise
that the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been
wholly nullifled." 74 This is a significantly different situation from
that in DiFrancesco,where the original sentence was nullified at
the government prosecutor's behest, without any action by the defendant.7 5 But, perhaps most importantly, the majority failed to
note that under Pearce, the imposition of greater sentences after

reconviction without proof of new acts committed by the defendant since the first sentencing would violate due process. 76 It would

seem that similar due process concerns are implicated in the review and possible increase of sentences on appeal by judges who
have had no access to the demeanor evidence presented at the trial
77
or sentencing hearing.
Finally, the Court found that the double jeopardy policies
which bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit the re-

view of a sentence. 78 According to the majority, a review of a sentence will not subject the defendant to the embarrassment,

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

he had been convicted." Id. at 672. In justifying this type of retrial after conviction, the Court relied on several theories throughout the years before apparently settling on the approach first expressed by Justice Harlan in United
States v. Tateo, 337 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) and adopted by the Court in Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978):
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the
societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has
obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to
pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because
of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.
377 U.S. at 466. However, the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial after a
conviction has been reversed because of insufficiency of the evidence.
Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19,24 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15
(1978). See Note, Double Jeopardy:A New Trial After Appellate Reversalfor
Insufficient Evidence, 31 U. CL I REV. 305 (1964).
449 U.S. at 136.
395 U.S. at 721 (emphasis added).
See note 31 & accompanying text, supra. For an argument that section 3576 is
unconstitutional because of the difference between defendants' appeals and
prosecutors' appeals, see Freeman & Earley, supra note 5, at 104-12.
395 U.S. at 726.
"[I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itsel; must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause." Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 358 (1977). For an argument that government appeal of a sentence
violates the due process right to a hearing and the right to be sentenced by a
judge witnessing the demeanor evidence see ABA Ad Hoc Committee, supra
note 5, at 629-31.
449 U.S. at 137.
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anxiety, expense, insecurity, and possibility of being found guilty
even though innocent, that can occur at a trial or retrial on the basic issue of guilt or innocence. 79 Justice Brennan sharply disagreed with the majority's characterization of the sentencing
process, exclaiming: "[C learly, the defendant does not breathe a
sigh of relief once he has been found guilty .... Surely, the Court
cannot believe then that the sentencing phase is merely incidental
and that defendants do not suffer acute anxiety." 80
Even though a review of a sentence may create less anxiety in
the defendant, it still appears that the majority ignored reality by
basing the impact of a sentence review on its own perception of the
law, 8 1 rather than on the mental state of the defendant who is actually undergoing the "ordeal" of possible sentence enhancement.
The majority again focused on its own perception of the impact
of sentence review on a defendant in dealing with the defendant's
expectation in the finality of his sentence. The majority concluded
that since a dangerous special offender sentence is always subject
to an increase on appeal, the defendant, "who is charged with
knowledge of the statute," can have no "legitimate expectation"
that his original sentence will be fnal.8 2 The principal dissent
characterized this reasoning of the majority as a "circular notion"
in which "the very statute which increases and prolongs the de83
fendant's anxiety alleviates it by conditioning his expectations."
Thus, through an examination of history, legal precedent, and
policy considerations, the majority concluded that acquittals are
given a greater degree of finality than are sentences. 84 As a result,
the Court found the line of acquittal cases 8 5 to be inapplicable to a
review of a sentence. 86 Once sentences were distinguished from
acquittals the Court had little trouble in holding that the applicamultiple trials in violation of
tion of section 3576 did not constitute
87
the double jeopardy clause.
The Supreme Court's holding in DiFrancesco limits the scope
of the double jeopardy guarantee against multiple prosecutions. It
is now clear that the "implied acquittal" rule of Greene will not be
79. Id.
80. Id. at 149-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. The majority noted that a review of a sentence is "nonadversarial in nature,"
and the period of the defendant's anxiety is prolonged "only for the finite
period provided by the statutes." Id. at 136.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 136.
85. E.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100 (1904).
86. 449 U.S. at 137.
87. Id. at 142.
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extended to sentences despite many logical similarities between
acquittals and sentences. 8 8 In distinguishing between the "ordeals" of trial and sentence review, the majority seems to close its
eyes to the possibility that the defendant could, in effect, undergo
what amounts to a second trial.89
B. Multiple Punishments
The protection against multiple punishments has been a part of
the double jeopardy guarantee ever since the Court held in Ex
parteLange9 Othat the double jeopardy clause bars the imposition
of an additional sentence upon a defendant who has completed the
maximum authorized sentence.91
The idea that increasing a sentence on appeal is unconstitutional was first suggested in United States v. Benz.92 Relying on Ex
parte Lange, the Court, while upholding the reduction of a sentence, indicated in dicta that an increase would offend the fifth
amendment:
The distinction that the court during the same term may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it, is not
based upon the ground that the court has lost control of the judgment in
the latter case, but upon the ground that to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution ....93
88. See notes 59-63 & accompanying text supra.
89. "The court of appeals on review of a sentence may... remand for further
sentencing proceedings and imposition of sentence ... ." 18 U.S.C. § 3576
(1976). Thus, a prosecutor may get another chance to present arguments that
he failed to muster at the first sentencing. See also Note, VA. L. RE V., supra
note 5, at 342-46 ("allowing the prosecutor to test the sentencing decision
before multiple sentencing authorities permits him to restructure his sentencing recommendations and enhances the likelihood that he can procure a
more severe sentence at some point in the process.") Id. at 345 (footnote
omitted).
90. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
91. Id. at 175-78.
92. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
93. Id. at 307. Dicta in a non-double jeopardy case, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957), also suggested the impermissibility of increasing sentences on appeal:
"In Swaim v. UnitedStates, 165 U.S. 553, this Court held that the President or
commanding officer had power to return a case to a court-martial for an increase in sentence. If the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment were applicable such a practice would be unconstitutional" Id. at 37-38
n.68, (plurality opinion). See also Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 160
(1900) (dicta).
The double jeopardy clause also requires that in sentencing a defendant
convicted upon retrial where the initial conviction was reversed, the court
must give credit for punishment already endured. Bozza v. United States, 330
U.S. 160, 165-67 (1947). However, "the guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no restriction upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719. Of course, the new sentence
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Despite this language, the DiFrancescomajority gave relatively
short shrift to the argument that an increase of a sentence on appeal under section 3576 constitutes multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause. First, the Court discounted the
Benz dictum as a statement of constitutional principle. 94 The majority determined that the Benz dictum, which had been followed
by a majority of the lower courts,9 5 was not supported by Ex parte
Lange.96 The majority stated that the Benz Court had erroneously
interpreted Lange as authority for the proposition that a court
could not increase a sentence once the defendant had begun to
serve it.97 The Court then limited the Lange holding to a situation
in which a court imposes both imprisonment and fine, but where
only one or the other punishment is authorized by statute. 98
Justice Brennan, in the principal dissent, contended that the
Lange holding did not purport to "exhaust the reach of the double
jeopardy clause."9 9 Apparently, the dissenters would agree with
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit' 00 that the frequency
and strength of previous dicta was sufficient to indicate a constitutional policy barring increase of a sentence on appeal by the
government.10'
The Court's holding that section 3576 does not constitute multiple punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clause in-

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

cannot exceed the statutory maximum, and due process requires that a sentence imposed upon reconviction which is longer than the original sentence
must be based on the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing. Id.
at 726.
449 U.S. at 139.
United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1976); Walsh v. Picard,
446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972); United States v.
Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 348 U.S. 902 (1954); Oxman v.
United States, 148 F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945);
Frankel v. United States, 131 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 1942); Rosley v. Welch, 114
F.2d 499,501 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), examined the
dicta in prior Supreme Court and courts of appeals' cases and concluded:
"[a]lthough such dicta of course are not legally binding, their number and
the high authority of their sources offer impressive evidence of the strength
and prevalence of the view that the double jeopardy clause bars an increase
in the sentence imposed by the district court." Id. at 785.
449 U.S. at 139.
282 U.S. at 307.
449 U.S. at 139.
Id. at 441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
604 F.2d at 785.
See note 95 supra; Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 703 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted in Ex
parte Lange prevents a sentencing court from increasing a defendant's sentence for any particular statutory offense, even though the second sentence is
within the limits set by the legislature.")
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creases the permissible range of government appeals in criminal
cases. No longer may Benz be relied upon as precedent for the
unconstitutionality of sentence increases. 0 2 By sharply restricting the scope of Lange, the Court appears to limit unconstitutional
multiple punishments solely to cases where the original sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum. 0 3 'It should be noted in this regard, that section 3576 provides for an increase in the defendant's
sentence only where the government is appealing the original sentence. 104 But it would appear that, without the support of previous
dicta indicating the unconstitutionality of sentence increases, state
and federal legislatures are free to write statutes allowing for an
increase of a sentence on appeal by either the government or by
the defendant. 0 5 This result is also made possible by the Court's
determination that a defendant's perception of the finality of his
sentence is conditioned by the statute that creates the anxiety in
the first place.106
Taking the majority's reasoning to its logical conclusion, one
could envision a statute allowing government appeal of sentences
imposed in response to guilty pleas, 0 7 or even allowing government appeal of verdicts of acquittal.108 The latter possibility
would, of course, be unconstitutional, and the Court has clearly indicated that verdicts of acquittal are to be treated differently and
are not appealable.O 9 But on a purely theoretical level, such statutes would be possible because, in the face of a statute allowing for
an appeal, say of an acquittal verdict, the defendant could have no
"expectation" in the finality of his acquittal (or sentence on a
guilty plea)." 0 Every sentence and acquittal could be styled as
102. See notes 92-98 & accompanying text supra.

103. An example of such an unconstitutional multiple punishment would be the
imposition by a sentencing judge of both a fine and imprisonment where the
maximum punishment allowable by statute is a fine or imprisonment
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) ("except that a sentence may be made more severe
only on review of the sentence taken by the United States").
105. E.g., while presently, in Alaska, an appellate court may increase a sentence
only when both the state and the defendant appeal the sentence, ALAsKA
STAT. § 12.55.120 (1969), one commentator noted:
It is likely that Alaska would allow for an increase of sentence on
appeal by the government alone if it were clear that such an increase
of sentence were constitutional. Moreover, it is likely that other
states would follow suit if the question of the constitutionality of an
increased sentence on appeal was decided in favor of such an
increase.
Dunsky, supra note 5, at 21.
106. 449 U.S. at 117-18.
107. Id. at 149, n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 150, (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. The principal dissent notes that, "[T] he court, of course, acknowledges
that verdicts of acquittal are not appealable." Id. at 150 n.10.
110. Id. See note 82-83 & accompanying text supra.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:828

merely "tentative.""' It is to be feared that the majority's holding
that section 3576 appeals of sentences are constitutional will allow
legislators to combine the Court's reasoning with statutory finesse
to extend the reach of government appeals into areas that have
heretofore been considered protected by the double jeopardy
clause.12
IV. CONCLUSION
In an area of law characterized by competing interests and devoid of clear precedent,113 the Supreme Court's decision in
DiFrancescorepresents a plausible application of double jeopardy
principles to government appeal of criminal sentences.114 By disregarding long followed dicta,"9 and by selectively distinguishing
sentences from constitutionally protected acquittals,11 6 the majority was able to uphold the constitutionality of section 3576. The
DiFrancescodecision is especially understandable in light of the
pressures for reform of the criminal justice system" 7 and the
growing demands for equalizing the interest of society with the
protections afforded criminals." 8
But is DiFrancescoa completely satisfactory, or proper, or even
necessary, response to the issues facing the Court?
The majority noted that there were alternative statutes available to Congress whereby the double jeopardy clause's bar could
have been avoided through the use of mandatory sentence
terms,119 or by styling lower court sentences as "tentative." 2 0 But
111. See 449 U.S. at 141. See also Note, VA. L REV., supra note 5, at 342-45, for
proposition that Congress has the power to define the sentencing process so
as to include the appellate review of sentences.
112. See, e.g., Lincoln Journal, Dec. 11, 1980, at 1, col. 1, where Paul Douglas, Attorney General for the State of Nebraska stated in reference to the DiFrancesco
decision: "I want to study it...
and if it says what I think it says, I intend to
try and get some legislation drafted to give Nebraska prosecutors the kind of
appeal authority their federal counterparts now have." He further indicated
the distinct possibility of drafting a state statute allowing a prosecutor to appeal a life sentence handed down in a murder trial and seek the death penalty instead. Id.
113. See note 44 & accompanying text supra.
114. While the dissenters were able to counter many of the specific arguments of
the majority no independant justification was offered necessitating an opposite result. 449 U.S. at 149-53.
115. See notes 92-98 & accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 57-89 & accompanying text supra.
117. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
118. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
119. 449 U.S. at 142. For a discussion of mandatory sentencing as an alternative to
indeterminate sentencing see Hearingson S. 30 Before the Subcommittee on
CriminalLaws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 184, 197 (1969) (remarks of Peter Low) reprintedin Low,
Special Offender Sentencing, 8 AM. Cmm. IQ. 70, 91 (1970).
120. 449 U.S. at 141. (analogous to a juvenile court procedure as in Swisher v.
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these approaches, like section 3576 as construed by DiFrancesco,
could lead to a change in the relationship between trial and appellate courts.' 2 ' No longer would a trial court's sentence serve as a
final judgment-such final judgment pronounced by a court that
had the opportunity to hear all the evidence and observe the defendant before determining the proper sentence.
The majority suggested that appellate review of sentences will
lead to a greater degree of "consistency in sentencing."' 22 But it
has also been suggested that "nothing is more unequal than treating unequal things equally."123 Sentences are, by their very nature, individual. Just as each crime and each criminal is different,
so too each sentence will vary depending on the degree of punishment deemed appropriate by the sentencer and the necessity to
protect society.12 4 But even assuming that review of government
appeals will lead to more uniformity, would such a result outweigh
the harm done to the individualized sentencing meted out by a
trial judge? 25
121.
122.
123.
124.

Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 216 (1978)).
449 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 143.
ABA Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5, at 605.
Id. at 635. "Rarely, if ever, in the real world can two separate and distinct acts

by different individuals at different times and different places and under different circumstances be viewed as equally guilty or morally reprehensible
even though they both constitute the same statutory offense." Id.
125. Several alternatives designed to produce more "consistent" sentencing have
been suggested. The ABA has proposed "separate sentencing hearings"
where the defendant, prosecutor, and the deciding judge would have the "full
benefits of live interrogation and demeanor evidence." ABA Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5, at 622. The ABA has also suggested the use of "sentencing
guidelines" to avoid "anomalies in sentences, particularly those at the draconian extreme... ." Id. However, the committee also noted the probable reaction if the government is allowed to appeal sentences not within the
guidelines:

Given the basic facts of human nature-prosecutors normally prosecute, judges usually do not like to be reversed-providing the government a right to appeal sentences that are below the guidelines would
be a form of subtle coercion of the sentencing judge that could turn
the lower end of the guidelines into something akin to a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence."
Id. at 636-37. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,27 (1973). Both of the bills recodifying the Federal
Criminal Code provide for separate sentencing hearings. See note 18 supra.
Judge Marvin Frankel, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, has proposed a system in which statutory codification and assignment of relative weight to specific sentencing criteria are used
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The Court also noted that section 3576 is a legislative attack on
too-lenient judges in organized crime cases. 126 But should the ocbe remedied
casional arbitrariness of a few judges in some cases
27
by allowing government appeals of all sentences?1
It should be remembered that the double jeopardy clause was
designed to provide individuals with protections against government oppression.128 The right of a defendant, to appeal his senequally balanced with a government right to
tence should not be
12 9
seek such review.
Nevertheless, as a result of DiFrancesco,there is no longer any
doubt as to the constitutionality of the appeals provisions of the
proposed revision of the Federal Criminal Code. 3 0 State legislatures are now free to write statutes along the lines of section 3576.
Perhaps the majority's treatment of appellate review of
sentences becomes more understandable when viewed against the
possible alternatives to such review. It is conceivable that a state
legislature, when faced with the unavailability of appellate review
of sentences, could provide for some form of automatic increase in
sentences such as that provided by habitual offender statutes. It is
possible then, that government sentence appeals provide an "out"
whereby state appellate courts can judici2ally correct sentences
which they feel are too low. It should also be recognized that there
is growing support for presumptive, guideline, or mandatory sentencing procedures as alternatives to indeterminate sentencing.131

126.
127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

as a means of correcting sentencing abuses. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CmN. L. R.v. 1, 46-48 (1972).
449 U.S. at 142.
"We should not try to remedy this minor deficiency in the constitutional safeguard of an independent judiciary by a general erosion of constitutional safeguards for individual liberty afforded by the bar against double jeopardy and
the right to due process." ABA Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 5, at 638. The
Committee goes on to suggest constitutional means to avoid biased judges:
"(1) careful screening of potential appointments to the Federal bench, (2)
motions for disqualification of judges before trial where reasonable grounds
exist and (3) actions for impeachment in the rare egregious instances." Id. at
639.
See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) ("At the
heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizens to a second trial for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression.")
See Greene v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 201-02 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (history of the evolution of the double jeopardy clause language indicates the intent of the drafters to bar governmental appeals, and yet allow
defendants to have that right).
Prior to the DiFrancesco decision some commentators believed that allowing
the "government to appeal sentences on the grounds that they are too lenient
would violate both the letter and the spirit of the Bill of Rights." ABA Ad Hoc
Committee, supra note 5, at 641. But see note 18 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 119, 125 & accompanying text supra.
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If such systems were to be legislatively adopted they would probably require some form of appellate sentence review.132 In this regard, DiFrancescomay be viewed as a judicial forerunner of what
soon will be a legislative reality.
David M. Lofholm '82

132. E.g., The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act provides for guideline sentencing and appellate review of sentences. See
Perlman & Potuto, The Uniform Law Commissioners"Model Sentencing and
CorrectionsAct. An Overview, 58 NEB. L. REV. 925, 933 (1979).

